5: American Russian Institute RF1 Great Russia RF1

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[For the complete text of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of January 21, 1937, as amended through May 27, 1949, see category 116, entire source.]

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[For a comparison of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of January 21, 1937, as amended through May 27, 1949, with other Constitutions of the USSR, see 70: American Russian Institute, R1 Soviet Union, category 116.]

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C O N S T I T U T I O N

(Fundamental Law)

of the

RUSSIAN

SOVIET FEDERATED

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

of January 21, 1937

As amended through May 27, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is a socialist State of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The political foundation of the Russian SFSR is the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and became strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Art. 3. In the Russian SFSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Russian SFSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the liquidation of the capitalist system of economy, the abolition of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

421 Art. 5. Socialist property in the Russian SFSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

[173] Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large state-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities, are state property, that is belong to the whole people.

421 474 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, [172] every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[423] Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

473 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Russian SFSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

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185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Russian SFSR is determined and directed by the State National-Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the socialist independence of the country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Russian SFSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Russian SFSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Russian SFSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Russian SFSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

631 Art. 14. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic consists of the Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoiarsk, Maritime, Stavropol and Khabarovsk Territories; the Archangel, Astrakhan, Briansk, Velikie Luki, Vladimir, Vologda, Voronezh, Gorky, Grozny, Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Kalinin, Kaluga, Kemerovo, Kirov, Kostroma, Crimean, Kuibyshev, Kurgan, Kursk, Leningrad, Molotov, Moscow, Murmansk, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orel, Penza, Pskov, Rostov, Riazan, Saratov, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Tambov, Tomsk, Tula, Tiumen, Ulianovsk, Chelia-binsk, Chita, Chkalov, Yaroslav and Amur Regions; the Tatar, Bashkir, Dagestan, Buriat-Mongolian, Kabardinian, Komi, Mari, Mordovian, North Ossetian, Udmurt, Chuvash and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics; and the Adygei, Jewish, Oirot, Tuvinian, Khakass and Cherkess Autonomous Regions.

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642 Art. 15. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 16. The territory of the Russian SFSR may not be altered without its consent.

[701] Art. 16a. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic has its own Republican military formations.

[649] Art. 16b. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

[670] Art. 17. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Russian SFSR.

[641] Art. 18. Every citizen of the Russian SFSR is a citizen of the USSR.

Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Russian SFSR equal rights with citizens of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Russian SFSR and control over its observance;

b) Confirmation of the Constitutions of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics;

c) Submission of the formation of new territories and regions and also of new Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation.

d) Establishment of boundaries, and of the division into districts, of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics and of Autonomous Regions;

e) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions and territories;

f) Legislation of the Russian SFSR;

g) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

h) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Russian SFSR;

i) Approval of the state budget of the Russian SFSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

j) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

k) Direction of the fulfilment of budgets of Autonomous Republics and of local budgets of territories and regions;

l) Direction of insurance and savings;

m) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

n) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

o) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

p) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places; road building; direction of local transport and communications;

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q) Labour legislation;
r) Legislation concerning marriage and the family;
s) Direction of public health;
t) Direction of social maintenance;
u) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;
v) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Russian SFSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;
w) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;
x) Organization of the judicial organs of the Russian SFSR;
y) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Russian SFSR;
z) Amnesty and pardon of citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Russian SFSR;
aa) Establishment of the representation of the Russian SFSR in international relations;
bb) Organization of the military formations of the Russian SFSR.

635 Art. 20. Every Autonomous Republic has its Constitution which takes into account its peculiar features and is constructed in full agreement with the Constitutions of the Russian SFSR and of the USSR.

Art. 21. The laws of the Russian SFSR have the same force within the territory of every Autonomous Republic. In the event of discrepancy between the law of the Autonomous Republic and a law of the Russian SFSR, the law of the Russian SFSR prevails.

Chapter III. The Higher Organs of State Power of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

646 Art. 22. The highest organ of state power in the Russian SFSR is the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

[642] Art. 23. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR exercises all rights vested in the Russian SFSR in accordance with Articles 13 and 19[1] of the Constitution of the Russian SFSR, insofar as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the Russian SFSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR, and the Ministries of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 24. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is the sole legislative organ of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 25. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Russian SFSR voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 150,000 of the population.

Art. 26. A law is considered adopted if passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR by a simple majority vote.

Art. 27. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR are published over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 28. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR elects a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and eight Vice-Chairmen.

1 [Cf. p.p. 2, 3-4--Analyst]

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645 Art. 53. Each Republican Ministry of the Russian SFSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR.

[642] Art. 54. The following Ministries of the Russian SFSR are Union-Republican Ministries of the Russian SFSR:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs
The Ministry of State Control
The Ministry of State Security
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of the Armed Forces
The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice.

Art. 55. The following Ministries of the Russian SFSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Chapter V. The Higher Organs of State Power of Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics

635 Art. 56. The highest organ of state power in an Autonomous Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 57. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Republic on the basis prescribed by the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.

Art. 58. The Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Autonomous SSR.

Art. 59. The Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic:

a) adopts the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic and proposes it to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR for confirmation;

b) determines the division of the Autonomous Republic into districts and the boundaries of districts and towns and proposes them to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR for confirmation;

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666 in elections to district Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of its population; a district with a population below 25,000 elects 25 deputies; a district with a population above 60,000 elects no more than 60 deputies;

In elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 1,000 of the population depending upon the size of the city; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000 35 deputies are elected;

In elections to the city Soviets of Moscow and Leningrad - one deputy for every 3,000 of their population;

elections to village and settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; rural localities (stanitsas, hamlets, auls) and settlements with a population below 1,000 elect 9 deputies; those whose population exceeds 2,500 - no more than 25 deputies.

The basis of representation for each Soviet of Working People's Deputies of territory, region, Autonomous Region, National and administrative Area, district, city, village and settlement is fixed in the Ordinance concerning Elections to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Territories, Regions, Areas, Districts, Cities, Villages and Settlements of the Russian SFSR within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 146. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral districts.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 147. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter XIII. Arms, Flag, Capital

196 Art. 148. The arms of the Russian SFSR are a sickle and hammer of gold placed crosswise, handles down, against a red background in the rays of the sun and surrounded by ears of grain, with the inscriptions "RSFSR" and "Workers of All Countries, Unite!"

Art. 149. The state flag of the Russian SFSR is of red cloth with a gold sickle and hammer and the gold letters "RSFSR" placed in the upper corner near the staff.

Art. 150. The capital of the Russian SFSR is the city of Moscow.

Chapter XIV. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 151. The Constitution of the Russian SFSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

000 This translation was made from a Russian text, with amendments through March 13, 1948, published by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1948. Additional amendments were incorporated from texts published in Izvestia through May 27, 1949.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

tion has provided moral and ideological foundations for the formation and the expansion of a globally oriented empire, while at the same time, it has also reinforced some of the elements in the structure of the Russian State which have been responsible for its explosiveness and instability.

In the Byzantine politico-religious system, the Church was not only a religious institution but also a political organization, and an arm of the political power. Byzantium therefore undertook to Christianize the Russian lands as a means of political penetration. Following Byzantine Church traditions and practices, the dominant native speech was adopted for Church services. Christianization therefore fostered also Slavization of these regions. Moreover, the Church of Byzantium carried with it the Byzantine concept of unity of Church and State, as well as that of a god-like monarchial power, with the mission to create a Universal Christian Empire.

The Eastern Church also sanctioned unlimited paternal authority and promoted protection-dependency relationships both on politico-administrative and on family levels. This Church sponsored unconditional obedience, attitudes of reverence and gratitude, and feelings of humility and self-effacement, fear and awe in the relations of man to his God, his Prince and his Father. According to the precepts of this Church-State philosophy, the authorities were held responsible for the well-being as well as for the failures and sins of their dependents. Thus the Byzantine Church was preparing psychological and ideological grounds for a politico-religious integration of Russian lands in a system of military theocracy, which became characterized by its Messianic ideology of world redemption and by its dominance-submission and protection-dependency relationships. But such a political system was in sharp conflict with the anarchic view of life and the equalitarian philosophy of family and community relations held by large sections of the population in that area.

This basic internal clash of ideologies in Russian society was intensified in the course of the following centuries when the pressure of the steppe nomads and of the expanding Western empires favored increased militarization, economic regimentation and centralization of total power in the hands of an auto-

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175 642 cratic Czar. By the time of Ivan the Terrible, the power of the independent landed aristocracy was suppressed, and the autocratic power rested now on a service nobility who were given lands in conditional possession depending upon their service and their loyalty to the Czar. These people therefore found themselves in a slave-like dependency upon the ruler who was likened to God, a situation that promoted political and social regimentation and fostered domineering-subservience relationships, thus intensifying the existing incompatibilities between the upper and lower strata of the Czardom.

[157] Domineering-subservience relationships are likely to breed humiliating experiences of self-abasement and feelings of wounded self-esteem which in turn might foster intense hostilities as well as compensatory ideas of grandeur. Thus in new circumstances, both self-seeking and power-orientation were reinforced in the upper strata, and manifested themselves in the oppressive rule of the nobility, in their extreme factionalism, and in their ruthless struggle for personal power and for the favors of the Czar.

[566] This trend of events, by the second part of the sixteenth century, led to establishment of serfdom and to direct interference of the service nobility and of the government in the communal and family relations of the peasantry. From this time on, the Church, the State and the landlords joined hands in strengthening the power of the Father and of the village elders and sponsoring in the peasant family and in the village community, dominance-submission relationships, absolute power and dependence, blind obedience and self-abnegation.

181 [579] The inevitable clash of this new power-oriented social philosophy with the old stateless and equalitarian values, was reflected in intense family and community tensions and in mass restlessness. Thus a weakening of power and of controls on any level—family, local, or national—opened the way to urges of destructive aggression and revolt against all the holders of power: the fathers, the village elders, the landlords, the Church and the Czar. Outbreaks of such extreme enmity were manifested in frequent communal riots, in mass vagrancy, in bloody revolutionary uprisings, and in widespread dissent from the official

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517 668 to bring about an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men on a global scale. Seeking to realize these bi-polar objectives, the Bolsheviks have inherited and reinforced the basic contradictions and conflicts between the aspirations of the rulers and those of the subjects which have throughout centuries undermined the stability of Czardom.

668 661 In their effort to perpetuate themselves in power, the Bolsheviks had to remain organized as a ruling elite of professional conspirators and to reinforce dominance-submission relationships in a system of total power concentrated in their hands. To maintain such a political rule, the Bolsheviks had to introduce a system of total dependence of all upon the holders of power and thus to reinforce the attitudes of self-effacement. They also established a planned system of social differentiation and isolation to prevent social intimacy and group solidarity and hence the potentiality of organized opposition to their rule.

668 771 In such conditions, feelings of rejection and traditional longings for an equalitarian and all-human brotherhood of men have been greatly strengthened among the subjects. It is this situation that points out the fundamental weakness of the Soviet system. To counteract the effects of this basic vulnerability of their regime, the Bolsheviks have endeavored to deify the Soviet rulers, have resorted to the damnation and anathema of the Western world, and have embarked on a propaganda campaign for a Messianic redemption of all suffering and exploited humanity. In this manner, the Bolsheviks have been able to appeal to supra-ethnical and supra-personal loyalties and to all-human longings, not unlike a universal church.

[208] The Bolsheviks have also endeavored to build up the morale of their subjects by means of prestige projects, by mythical undertakings, by mass pageantry, mass unanimous voting and large scale militarization. All these devices are conceived as ways to provoke emotional identification of the masses with the Soviet State and to find in this identification a substitute for their yearnings for a community of free and equal men.

642 665 Total dominance and total submission relationships which have to be maintained to perpetuate this conspiratorial system of power have introduced other basic strains and stresses in the

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Soviet social and political structure. The ruling Party which has to remain as an organization of militant conspirators in order to perpetuate itself in power, must also rely for the recruitment of its cadres to a large extent on calculating "careerists" and other self-seekers, who identify themselves not with their group and their society but with the holders of power. The main concern of these people is to rise in the Party and State hierarchy. In their jockeying and struggle for positions and favors, these power-oriented people introduce into the Party and into the government an atmosphere of subservience and ruthlessness, rivalry and intrigue, each seeking to rise on the cadavers of his associates.

Just as in the society of steppe warriors, such a ruling group of power-seekers who are not bound by deep moral bonds or ties of ideological loyalty can be kept together as long as the opportunities for self-aggrandizement exist, or as long as there is a common threat to their positions. Hence a cult of hatred of internal and external "enemies," political expansion, conspiracy on a world scale and planned international tension—short of all-out warfare—have become conditions of survival of Bolshevik power.

This situation forces the Bolsheviks to preoccupy themselves with the problems of security, of defense, and of extension of their political power; it prompts them to subordinate the economic production and the intellectual endeavors to these primary needs of their political survival. Such conditions, in turn, make it difficult to satisfy the demands of the masses for acceptance and for a better and more secure life—a situation that tends to deter the subjects from identifying themselves with the rulers and with the State. And it is this aggravating antithesis between the longings of the multitudes and the power-drive of a ruling clique that breeds social upheaval and intensifies urges for destructive aggression.

It is therefore imminent that we think in terms of planned external pressures which might be brought to bear upon the resolution of this gigantic internal struggle before it reaches the proportions of a global war.

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II

Following Byzantine traditions and being entirely dependent upon and identified with the dominant political power, the Russian Orthodox clergy supported the autocratic reign of Muscovite rulers by means of an apotheosis of the Czar. According to this theocratic ideology the role of the Church was to be the loyal ally and helper of the Czar who derived his authority directly from God. The Czar's judgment could be overruled by no prelate. In his effort, common with that of the Church to establish a divine order on the whole earth, the Czar had to be unconditionally supported.[6]

Native Russian, Byzantine and Turco-Mongol institutions and concepts were blended in this system of Russian imperial theocracy. According to the Mongol idea of imperial power the emperor was the owner of the body and of the property of each one of his subjects. He was, however, disinterested in their souls and conscience. Thus, as far as religious beliefs were concerned, the Mongol rulers showed a great deal of tolerance; being interested mainly in collecting the tributes and not in governing they did not look at religion and clergy as allies in ruling. The shamans among the Ural-Altaic peoples were not organized as a priestly class and the Mongol emperor, even after he had accepted Islam, did not see any potential threat to his imperial power in any religion. In that system of power there was a complete separation of religion and politics.

In Byzantium, on the other hand, the Church was a powerful and well-organized force with imperial ambitions. But the Church was subdued to the imperial and personal interests of the lay ruler. The Church often succeeded, however, in using the imperial power for its own ends. At the same time the Byzantine Emperor in legal theory did not rule in his own right, but derived his authority from the people. In legal theory, he was an elected monarch and was subjected to the supreme rule of law, even if the law emanated from him. There was thus in Byzantium a well established set of laws which bound equally the Emperor and his subjects and guaranteed also certain rights to the subjects.

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177 642 The ideology of Moscow imperial theocracy was rooted in the power-centered traditions of Russian princes, reinforced by a fusion of Mongol and Byzantine political ideas and practices. As among the Mongols, the Czar was considered to be the supreme owner of the body and of the property of his subjects, but as among the Byzantines he was also concerned with their souls. At the same time, according to the Muscovite political philosophy, the Czar as owner of his subjects derived his authority not from the people, as in Byzantium, but directly and exclusively from God.[7] Therefore, the Czar alone possessed rights, his subjects only duties.

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In the Muscovite system of theocratical power not only was the Czar's freedom unlimited by any laws, but his personal will was not limited by any recognized human rights either. The Czar was considered to be limited only by his duty to God and by Divine law. The Czar, however, was himself the sole judge of his duty to God. He himself was the sole interpreter of Divine Law in regard to temporal affairs. Even the head of the Church could only supplicate but not advise him in these matters. The Czar was therefore at liberty to use the law capriciously as an instrument of his personal power, or to break the law at his convenience. And so he often did.[8]

643 565 Supported by the imperial ambitions of the Church, Muscovite rulers had two main objectives. One was the solidification of the unlimited personal power of the Czar to which all institutions of law and order were subjected; the other consisted of territorial expansion at the expense of the neighboring countries. The hereditary magnates—the local princes and the boyars —were obstacles in the path of both of these objectives. This landed aristocracy, following the traditions of early Russian princes, insisted on their personal and manorial privileges and resented any interference of the Muscovite Czar. They were therefore in favor of limitation of the Czar's power.

565 643 At the same time, however, these magnates were members of an advisory council to the Czar (*Boyarskaya Duma*); in this council some of them were closer to the Czar and formed an inner circle which exerted more power and influence on the affairs of the state. The boyars were therefore not unified and did not

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565 423 701 dependency of the land recipients upon the Czar, because the Czar could at any time withdraw the grant.

642 565 423 By means of the pomestie system of land tenure which prevailed in the second part of the sixteenth century the Muscovite rulers obtained both of their objectives: unlimited power and permanent war preparedness. Once the owners of the estates became dependent upon the Czar for the possession of their lands, any opposition on their part could be crushed easily, especially if the caste solidarity and the development of an *esprit de corps* among these people could be prevented. By the end of the seventeenth century the hereditary land tenure and the conditional land tenure were equalized. As a result all nobility became service nobility (*dvorianstro*), dependent upon the Czar for their lands. All therefore became *holopy*, the slaves of the supreme *gosudar* (master). Neither type of land holder could alienate his land either by sale, exchange, or any other process. The principle was that "He who owned land should serve the Czar."

178 642 565 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, by making the nobility economically dependent and having the support of the Church, the Muscovite Czars were enabled to eliminate all potential opposition to their rule and to perpetuate their despotic power. After the nobility was subdued and regimented, the other classes, including the clergy, followed suit. By the end of the seventeenth century the slaves and free land tenants were equalized and bound to the land and burghers were bound to their [486] *posads*. It was prohibited for any person to move from one town or borough to another without special permit. There could be a penalty of death for such flight or desertion.

By this time, therefore, all persons were bound to their status. A rigid caste system was established for the purpose of securing for the Czar permanent and controllable bodies of people whose function was either to pay cess or to render military and state service. The whole state was regimented and militarized for the [641] purpose of the Czar's aggrandizement, defense of the realm and military campaigns; each person had one duty only—to serve the Czar and the country. The whole society was geared to increase the revenues and the military might of the Czardom.

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III

The atmosphere of despotism, servility, fear and awe which developed under this system of total regimentation and dependency left an imprint on the habits and the attitudes of the people and had some influence on the shaping of their values and of their views of life. In conditions of complete dependency and domineering-subservience relationships, self-concern, destructive aggressiveness, as well as fatalistic resignation, are likely to thrive, not personal and social responsibility, moral obligations or group solidarity.

This trend of events meant also increasing social restlessness and political instability which in turn favored the rise to leadership of ruthless power-seekers and psychopaths. Lack of limitation on the personal power of the Czar, dissensions among the nobility and want of responsibility and of emotional balance in the person of the Czar led often to extreme excesses in Czar's rule.[11] All the attempts of the boyars to transform the Boyarskaya Duma into a legislative body were unsuccessful. Since the end of the seventeenth century even the *Zemski Sabor*, the consultative body of representatives of all classes, ceased to be convoked.

Only when the throne became vacant and the omnipotent Czar was gone did this nobility sometimes attempt to squeeze out promises and pledges from the pretenders to the throne. But, even then the remnants of the old boyar class and the new service nobility clashed over the question of control. Hence as soon as the new monarch was installed he did not have any difficulty in establishing his unlimited control and in proceeding to rule arbitrarily in face of a divided dvorianstvo.

The Czar could do anything he pleased with the nobles, including personal chastisement. They were treated as minors by the Czar and trained in blind and unconditional obedience. In the Czar's presence they observed dead silence. Anything that came from his hand, even the most degrading treatment, was to be received with resignation or even regarded as a sign of distinction. At the same time, however, while the nobles were exposed to all kinds of threat, terror and indignities on the part

7 [i.e. Czardom by end of 17th century.. Analyst]

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They used to go starke naked, save a clout about their middle, with their haire hanging long and wildely about their shoulders, and many of them with an iron coller in chaine about their neckes or middles, even in the very extremity of winter. . . . Among others at this time they have one at Mosco that walketh naked about the streets, and inveyeth commonly against the state and government. . . . Another there was, that dyed not many years agoe . . . that would take upon him to reproove the olde emperour, for all his cruelties and oppressions done towards his people. His body they have translated of late into a sumptuous church neere the emperours house in Mosco, and have canonized him for a saint. Many miracles he doth there. . .[15]

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Another form of protest or of reaction against the existing conditions consisted of mass vagrancy. Many thousands of these restless people were roaming the roads, the forests, and the deserts, as beggars, as pilgrims or as agricultural nomads. Many of them spent whole lives wandering, unable to find peace and rest.

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Conditions in which abusive dominance-submission relationships, self-concern, lack of trust, and destructive aggression thrive do not favor unification and stability of an empire. Yet the Czardom showed a steady and remarkable development in spite of such unfavorable circumstances. In the course of several centuries it had grown from a small principality into a great world power. Just as in the states of steppe nomads, the social agents which were responsible for self-seeking, power-orientation and internal restlessness and explosiveness encouraged also external expansion. But unlike the empires of the steppes, there were in the Empire of the Czars several circumstances which fostered ideological and moral unity, such as the politico-religious philosophy of the Orthodox Church and conditioning on the family and community-level. It was perhaps this combination of the explosive and unifying tendencies which was responsible for steady expansiveness and growing consolidation of the Czardom.

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From its very inception the Russian state was a military soci-

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6
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND RUSSIA'S BUREAUCRATIC AUTOCRACY

I

THE STRUCTURE of Muscovite power had some advantages in comparison with the Turco-Mongol system of rule. The steppe warriors had not developed an efficient system of administration. They depended upon their vassals for the collection of taxes. This practice gave an opportunity to the vassals to enrich themselves, which strengthened their feelings of independence and of revolt. In the same manner the principle of religious tolerance and the practice of granting Church autonomies helped to perpetuate religious, linguistic and cultural differences among the subjects, a situation that did not favor ideological unification and centralization of power. In Russia, on the other hand, a system of centralized administration which followed the Byzantine pattern took care of revenues and of military manpower. The enserfed agricultural population was a source of steady income. Furthermore, state dominated Church tended to Slavicize linguistically and to unify ideologically all subjects under the Czar.

However, this system of Muscovite military theocracy that was efficient in dealings with the Mongols, proved inadequate in Russia's relations with its adversaries in the West. Since the end of the middle ages Western countries went through a series of ideological and economic changes which had fundamentally affected the structure of the Western world. Humanism and Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-reformation, the industrial and political revolutions had brought about considerable intellectual and technological advance and radical structural changes. Compared to the West, Russia had many drawbacks in her economic system. Its power-centered and militarized social struc-

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ture was detrimental to the development of trade and industry. For centuries its economy remained founded on a system of primitive agriculture. Lack of large centers of trade and industry adversely affected rural economy. There was no stimulation for agricultural improvements and for freeing of the serfs. Instead, the emphasis was on the exploitation of serf labor as the most expedient means to satisfy the demands of the landlords and of the state. The landlords were mostly absent on military campaigns or other state duties and were generally disinterested in land improvements. At the same time the system of using the land as a pay for military or other state services, in a country whose war campaigns and military contingents were increasing, tended to diminish the size of the donations and increase the burdens imposed on the serfs.

The lack of urbanization, together with the low standard of education of the service nobility, kept also the intellectual development of Russia far behind that in the West. Intellectual activity was limited mainly to the court circles. The ideology and practices of the Russian Church favored intellectual stagnation. Russia accepted Christianity from Byzantium after the Greek Church had already given up classical traditions of Hellenism. By the time Byzantine Christianity entered Russia, Byzantine literature had assumed an almost exclusively ecclesiastical character, and education consisted almost entirely of religious teaching and the reading of the lives of the saints. Art, too, became exclusively religious and stereotyped. All thought was regimented according to religious dogmas and political objectives of the power-holders.

In Russia this type of intellectual rigidity and inactivity was emphasized because of the use of the Old-Slavonic language in the Church, which resulted in neglect of Greek language. And it was considered a sin to learn the "thrice accursed Latin tongue." Thus, the Russian clergymen became isolated from the West because they lacked the possession of the only instruments in which human knowledge was communicated in those days. Moreover, Russian Orthodoxy, like the Byzantine Orthodoxy, was based on monasticism. But unlike the manifold monastic practices of the Western Church, the monks in the Russian Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism aimed at personal salvation.

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Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism aimed at personal salvation.[1]

However, from the seventeenth century on, Russia's expansion, which was earlier oriented mainly toward the East, turned westward. The wars with the West which heretofore were mainly defensive, tended to acquire an increasingly offensive character. But the wars with the advanced Western countries were more difficult and much more costly than those with the economically and technologically backward Asiatics. The defeats which Russia suffered at the hands of the Swedes and Poles made it imperative for the Czars to increase the military effectiveness of their country to meet the challenge. This need dictated changes in the internal structure of the Czardom, in the direction of administrative and industrial advance along European patterns. Even before Peter the Great, measures had been taken in this direction. But it was Peter who dramatized the issue by himself going abroad as an apprentice in Western industries to become "the first carpenter of the Empire."

In accordance with such need the old system of administration based on service nobility was replaced by a system of salaried officials (*chinovnichestvo*). According to this *chin* (civil rank) system which was introduced by Peter the Great and which followed the Western pattern it was no longer necessary to belong to the dvorianstvo class in order to obtain state service. On the contrary, any one who served faithfully and efficiently could rise in chin and rank and thus obtain the status of a hereditary or of a personal *dvoryanin*, without even owning land. In this way a new salaried military and bureaucratic caste, entirely dependent upon the Czar, was growing at the expense of the landed dvorianstvo. As a result, the dvoryanin-guardsman, the chief state functionary of the eighteenth century, was replaced by the *chinovnik*-commoner in the nineteenth century. Chinovnichestvo absorbed and replaced dvorianstvo—just as earlier the dvorianstvo had absorbed and replaced boyarstvo. Now bureaucracy instead of military nobility became the main instrument of governing.[2]

This change in the structure of the Czardom, however, was accomplished from above, that is, by means of imperial decrees,

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not by means of a popular revolution as in the West. Accordingly the new bureaucratic rule was based on the *Ukaz*[3] and the knut as much as the old order. For the same reason, though the state was formally secularized, the traditions of an autocracy, divinely ordained and supported by God, were carried on by every official as the representative of the Czar.[4]

Therefore the new system of autocracy based on bureaucracy, the same as the old one based on service nobility, could not recognize any political or personal rights of the subjects. Nor could there have developed any *esprit de corps* among the new governing class. This new class of officials owned little or no land and had to live on meager salaries, but was eager to follow the traditions and the high standards established by the old landed nobility. The chinovnichestvo therefore became even more dependent upon the Czar than the dvorianstvo was earlier. There was even less *esprit de corps* and less solidarity in the new governing class than in the old. Each official was constantly in fear of jeopardizing his own social position if he stood up in defense of any of his colleagues. Besides, in this hierarchical system of power the ruin or falling into disfavor of one official often meant the ascendancy of the other. There was, therefore, a tendency to take advantage of such a situation, to resort to intrigues and calumnies, and to help to destroy rather than to rehabilitate a victim.

All the powers, the lawmaking, the application of law, and the justice were placed into the hands of these bureaucrats. At the same time the system of checks and controls was very deficient. Laws were enacted by special temporary commissions of high officials, and created *ad hoc*. The Council of State, a supreme policy-making body, composed of about seventy to eighty highest dignitaries, was appointed by the Czar to serve him only in advisory capacities. The final decision rested in the hands of the Czar, or with the camarilla clique which happened at the moment to be most influential. The Empire was administratively divided into provinces (*gubernia*) which were usually headed by army generals. The gubernias were divided into districts which were headed by chiefs of police. The governors, supported by the police, ruled autocratically in their domains. They were

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was invested with the most extensive powers and was given as its special mission the task of looking after the safety of the state and overseeing the doings of all departments, of all public functionaries, and of all people. The security police was an omnipotent and all-powerful body before whom all subjects were considered guilty unless they proved the contrary. This institution—developed in the course of centuries—became of paramount importance to its rulers. It became one of the most essential wheels of the government and one of the chief cares of the ruling class.[16]

III

Hierarchical relations of strict superordination and subordination in the military and bureaucratic ranks might foster feelings of identification with the mighty and the powerful. It is on such grounds that imperialistic nationalism and ideas of national superiority and grandeur thrive. And when state is fused with the Church in a system of theocratic militarism then nationalism might acquire also the aspects of religious fanaticism.

Expansion, greatness of the state, ideas of grandeur and Messianic ideas of world redemption or world domination might provide also compensation for humiliations, self-abasement, feelings of inferiority and unworthiness and other frustrations which are fostered in a system of abusive domineering-subservience relationships. As a result love of show, display of military might and need for conquests preoccupied the ruling strata of post-Petrine Russia as much as those of the Muscovite state. The Czar's court, the nobility, the military, the bureaucracy, the Church, the cities and the villages tended to display a grandeur that was in sharp contrast with the poverty of the country.[17]

This tendency toward exhibitionism and ideas of greatness was manifested also in the glorification of Russia, and the belief in the sacredness of its exalted mission in the world. Such attitudes and feelings which were rooted in the rigidly hierarchical military and bureaucratic structure were supported also by the Third Rome traditions of the Russian Church according to which Providence itself had bestowed upon Russia's rulers the role of the redeemers of mankind. According to these traditions and teachings Russia was a God-chosen country, the only country

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where true Christianity was preserved. In the official statements, in the prayers, in the Church sermons and school textbooks, the Russian Empire was represented as a Holy Land (*Sviataya Rus*).

Accordingly, official geographic studies and statistics tended to magnify everything within the frontiers of the Empire. Russian possessions and might, the resources and riches of the Czar, the progress and virtues of the country were pictured in the school textbooks in a fabulous way. A steady and imposing territorial growth of the Czardom in the course of many centuries at the expense of the East and the West undoubtedly supported these feelings of greatness. In this manner successes in policies of external expansion promoted desires for further conquests.

As long as the authority of the Church remained unshaken the power of the Czar rested on solid foundations. The Czars were able to increasingly concentrate and monopolize all social power while the Czardom expanded territorially in all directions, in spite of all its internal weaknesses.

In the meantime, however, the economic, educational and religious reforms introduced since the eighteenth century tended to undermine the sacredness of the Church as well as the power of the Czar. It was in such circumstances that feelings of revolt bred on all levels of social organization had an opportunity to come into the open, challenging the Czarist regime and all the institutions on which it was based. The people who were treated like wards and minors and were kept in oppressive dependency in the family, in the local community and on the state level rebelled against the system which kept them in perpetual bondage, a trend of events which finally brought about the downfall of the Czardom. The family roots and the development of this personal and social revolt which had shattered the Czardom will be discussed on the following pages.

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former role as main instruments of the Czar's power to a parvenu bureaucracy and military that leaders of first opposition movements were recruited.

Even before and during the French Revolution a number of Russian landed nobility became aware of the ideas of the Revolution. They were also becoming increasingly interested in constitutional forms of government in which they could take part in their own right, not depending upon the whims of a despotic monarch. Some of these people even became dissatisfied with serfdom because of its economic inefficiency. They were also becoming increasingly impatient with absolutism because of its oppressive and degrading aspects.

Such ideas and feelings penetrated the officers' corps and a number of this military intelligentsia organized themselves into a secret society and formulated a concrete program for constitutional changes.[1] Some of these people came from high nobility. Others, especially those from the South, were impoverished nobles living on meager officer's salaries. In December, 1825 these people attempted to seize power. However, owing to ideological differences and the traditional factional splits within the dvorianstvo, the attempt of this faction of military intelligentsia to gain power was thwarted.[2] Nevertheless, this uprising of the "Decembrists," though abortive, was the beginning of increasing revolutionary activities of the intelligentsia[3] which finally brought about the overthrow of the Czardom in the Revolution of 1917.

The revolt of the Decembrists was a sign that the Czardom had already gone through such changes in its social structure that a change in its political system was overdue. The most important change in this structure was the formation of a class which, for the first time in Russia's history, became economically independent of the Czar, and which, though economically idle and not always prosperous, became intellectually very alert and also very sensitive to Western ideas.

In accordance with the traditional behavior pattern of Russian nobility, their reactions to the conditions at home and to Western thought tended to develop in the direction of two opposite extremes. One was that of the "Westerners" who were

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plosive revolutionary material. Hence the Bolsheviks began to send their agitators into the village.

There was no tendency among these extremists and maximalists to make use of peaceful means which had now been made possible by the Czar's Manifesto of October, 1905. In this manifesto legislative powers were given to Duma (house of representatives) and a certain degree of political, cultural and personal freedom was introduced. On the contrary these professional conspirators, following Anarchist precepts and practices, took advantage of increased opportunities for political agitation. That year the Socialist Revolutionaries in one of their proclamations stated: "If you need more land, hay, pasture, timber, take it from the landlord. Do not pay taxes. Drive evil priests out of the villages, boycott the courts, replace bad officials by good, throw out the police!"[12] In the same year the Bolsheviks, struck by the increasing restlessness in the village, called upon the peasants and the village proletariat for a "collective refusal to pay taxes, refusal to furnish recruits, refusal to fulfill the orders and commands of the government and its agents."[13]

III

Such revolutionary ideas which were infiltrating the villages not only confirmed the peasants in their beliefs and dispositions; they also tended to promote their feelings of rebelliousness, to radicalize them in the extreme, and push them toward excesses. In common with most tillers of land, the Russian peasants were convinced that the land by "natural right" belonged only to those who cultivate it, and that somehow, sometimes in the past, the land was taken away from them by force and trickery, not by right and justice.

The question of ownership of land was closely related to humiliating subservience to the landlords, the commune and the state. Ownership of land meant the regaining of self-respect. The peasants were therefore inclined to believe that they never lost the right to the land and that someday, somehow, all the land would have to be given back to them. "We are yours, but the land is ours" (*My vashi a zemlya nasha*), the peasants would say to the pomeshchiks. The speeches of the peasants' deputies

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V

Power and Personality in Soviet Russia

21
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND REGIMENTATION

I

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BUILDING their rule on Czarist traditions and supported by Lenin's teachings and practices, the Bolsheviks undertook to perpetuate themselves in power by employing the same conspiratorial means which helped them to seize the control of the state. Such policies however were contrary to the expectations of those who yearned for an equalitarian brotherhood and demanded full political participation on equal terms for all. The Bolsheviks therefore had to elaborate on the theories which justified the "dictatorship of the proletariat." One of the fundamental ideological justifications which they put forward to explain their policy of self-perpetuation in power consisted of the claim that after the seizure of power by the proletariat, the class struggle does not cease or weaken, but on the contrary it "continues in new forms, and with even greater frenzy and ferocity, for the reason that the resistance of the exploiters to the fact of socialism is more savage than before."[1] Continued dictatorship

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is therefore said to be necessary as a means to completely eliminate "exploitation of man by man" and to bring about stateless and equalitarian society in the future.

In this manner any signs of opposition to the Party policies have been construed as "class struggle" and "counter-revolution" which made it possible for the self-seeking and mistrustful ruling faction of the Bolsheviks to eliminate all opposition to its rule, including the opposition within the Bolshevik Party itself. These means and justifications of self-perpetuation in power have been supported also by the contention that the counter-revolutionary schemes of the overthrown and dying classes are encouraged and fostered by foreign capitalist powers.

These imperialist states are said to tend to encircle the "only Socialist country" seeking to destroy it.[2] Contrary to the early Socialist promises that the state will tend to "wither away" after the proletariat had seized power, the Bolsheviks asserted that, after the proletarian revolution the state must become even more powerful because it must be used as a "special machine of suppresion."[3] Thus, instead of satisfying the traditional demands for acceptance in an all-human and stateless brotherhood, the Bolsheviks established relationships of absolute rule and unconditional obedience by monopolizing all social power in their hands. Each and every subject was made dependent for his life and livelihood upon the ruling faction. In this manner, planned economic regimentation, strict political conformity, control of thought and feeling, as well as police rule became intrinsic to the Soviet system of power.

In their compulsive drive to concentrate all power and all social control in their hands, the Bolsheviks dispossessed not only financial capitalists and large land owners, but even small farmers, fearing that these might eventually oppose and challenge their rule. "The medium peasantry is a self-sufficient class; the only one which, after the obliteration and expulsion of squires and capitalists, remains capable of opposing the proletariat," said Lenin.[4]

The need to regiment the peasantry, to break their group solidarity and make them completely dependent upon the government was supported also by other considerations. Owing to lack

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This trend to expropriate the peasants and to overspecialize them as a means of political and economic control found its expression in the recent development of Bolshevik ideology. In the utterances of Party leaders and in the Soviet press it is being stressed that the conditions in the Soviet Union are already so advanced that the Soviet state is ready to move from socialism into the first levels of a limited Communism. This first phase of Communism will consist of the elimination of differences between industrial and agricultural work, between industrial workers and the peasantry ("Liquidating the contrast between the city and the village"). Thus it is pointed out, the old opposition between the country and the city will vanish and also cultural and psychological differences between these two strata will disappear. Every person will become engaged in a special "technical-engineering" task and all will be equal and like brothers.

As a result of such development, it is said that even the differences between the manual laborer and the intellectual worker will eventually be abolished and thus the classless and anarchic society envisaged in socialist writings and rooted in the traditions of the Slav culture will be finally achieved.[11] Productive forces will develop an abundance of all consumer goods whose distribution will be on the basis of exchange and according to one's needs. There will be no monetary relations and no differences in social status.

It is clearly and repeatedly emphasized, however, that nobody should mistake this change from socialism to communism as a "withering away" of the state. The state, say the Bolsheviks, must remain "strong" for the needs of defense,[12] until the Soviet system spreads over the entire earth.

II

Total power concentrated in the hands of Bolshevik conspirators as a means of perpetuation of their rule led to compulsory regimentation of all labor, to speed-up system, and to intensified differentiation in skill, income, and status within the working classes. The aim of these measures is to increase production and to control the working classes by breaking their group solidarity and by tying the laborer to his machine and the office worker to

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pletely dependent upon and submissive to the ruling Party that the old idea of freedom in the choice of work and equality of opportunity was replaced by emphasis on the "discipline of labor," that is, the contention that the objective of high output demands specialization and that in the interest of increasing the skill one cannot recognize the freedom to change one's speciality and one's job.[17] It is also stressed now that an important element in the process of production is the "habit of hard work,"[18] and this habit could best develop as "the first life necessity" if the freedom of choice of specialty and of place of work is restricted and controlled.[19]

In accordance to this imperative need of the Bolsheviks to keep the working classes in complete subjection, Soviet propaganda idealizes hard work. Humble (*skromny*), infinitely devoted (*bezgranichno predany*), and hard working people, those who "burn with desire to work," and those who "sacrifice their lives to working for the cause of Lenin-Stalin," are especially eulogized. In the obituary of some outstanding person the climax of eulogy is the statement that death reached him while he was struggling at his post of duty.[20] In the Stalinist Constitution of 1936 this system of labor subordination to the ruling Party is eulogized as a "matter of honor" and is justified in terms of the right of the Party to starve those who do not work according to the Party interests:

> In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."[21]

III

Building on practices of Czarist bureaucratic hierarchy and supported by traditions of patriarchal protection-dependency relationships, the Bolshevik rulers have succeeded in regimenting the industrial labor and in forcing it into unconditional submission to and dependency upon the ruling Party. But they have failed to increase the productivity of labor. Frequent reenactments of measures to increase "labor discipline" indicate, however, that to increasing measures of regimentation the industrial

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much possibility for self-expression, creativeness and personal satisfaction.[24]

On the other hand an atmosphere of domineering and vigilantism offers a great opportunity for advance to the fanatic Party member as well as to the ambitious and unscrupulous careerist within the labor ranks, and the ranks of technicians and engineers. Even among those managers and foremen who might otherwise have different inclinations, the need to maintain their positions often forces them towards a policy of vigilantism, cynicism and oppressive labor driving.

22
INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONFORMITY

I

THE SYSTEM of dominance, based on economic dependence, social isolation and lack of trust, which has enabled the Bolsheviks to monopolize all social power, has helped them also to force the intellectual strata into unconditional submission to the will of the ruling minority. Just as the land has been collectivized and industrial production governmentalized to make the peasants and the industrial labor dependent upon the Party, so all sources of income in the intellectual fields have been monopolized by the Party-state to make the intellectuals completely dependent for their lives and livelihoods upon the ruling faction of the Bolsheviks. The office tenure of this new service nobility has been conditioned upon their blind submission to the rulers in the Kremlin, just like in the days of the old dvorianstvo.

The educated strata are of a special strategic importance from the point of view of self-perpetuation of the Bolsheviks in power, because it is these strata that provide ideological and political leadership and Party cadres. The party has endeavored therefore to make the intelligentsia even more socially split and dependent

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upon the regime than the peasantry and industrial labor. The objective of this policy has been to prevent among the intelligentsia formation of an *esprit de corps* and opposition to Bolshevik rule, and to command the services and unquestionable obedience of every educated man. These are the political foundations of the growing and deliberately fostered stress on rank and distinction, on social differentiation, sense of superiority and inferiority, absolute superordination and blind subordination.

In the upper strata, much more so than in the lower classes, the process of hierarchal and functional differentiation is fostered and maintained not only by means of specialization of work and differences in rank, but also by means of sharply differentiated income, and by means of differential distribution of spoils, and of privileges. This sharp stratification of Soviet society, rooted in the traditions of the Czardom, in its own turn promotes power-seeking and domineering, dependency and subservience, as well as lack of social intimacy and lack of trust.

The highest privileges in the Soviet society are accruing to the top ruling faction of professional conspirators. But this group is itself internally sharply differentiated. It is headed by the Party Leader (*Vozhd*), and is divided into a number of policy making bodies, among which the Political Bureau (Politburo), now to be known as the Presidium,[1] is of foremost importance. Though the members of the Presidium and of other top policy making bodies, such as the Secretariat, are formally appointed by the Central Committee of the Party, they are *de facto* selected by the supreme leader and therefore depend upon him for their position. Such a situation fosters bickering among top ranking officials in their mutual struggle to win the favors of the head man, which in turn enables the supreme Party leader to play one faction of his camarilla against the other one or—not unlike in the days of the Czars—to select a more intimate inner circle of a few most trusted persons on whom to rely for advice and help. These then assist the leader in selecting and in eliminating the members of the top ranking hierarchy, according to expediency and circumstances.

This highly concentrated power structure is supported by a

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those accounts of Soviet life in which the gloomy appearance of the city populace is contrasted to the more optimistic outlook of the country folk.[34]

25
DESTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION

I

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PROMPTED by extreme power-seeking and by deeply rooted mistrust of their own subjects, the Bolsheviks have built a monolithic Party-state system which differs in the degree of its rigidity and power concentration from all other systems of despotism, theocracy, military dictatorship, totalitarian and police state. In those autocratic political systems not all aspects of life are regimented. A certain limited degree of freedom is left at least in some spheres of personal and of group behavior. But the main difference between these systems and the Bolshevik regime is that while the former prohibits only those activities which have a direct negative bearing upon perpetuation of the system, the latter allows only such behavior as has a direct positive bearing upon the perpetuation of the ruling faction in power.

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In the Soviet society the ruling class is not content with mere passive acceptance of the Bolshevik rule. It demands of each subject a "positive attitude" toward the regime. In such a society there is necessarily a premium in terms of privileges and power for the activities in the fields of political organization and agitation, of vigilance and violence, as well as in the fields of labor-driving, economic management, and military preparedness, since it is in the main upon such activities that perpetuation of Bolshevism depends. In such a "prison and barracks society", it is the calculating and ambitious careerists and zealous devotees and watchdogs, specialists in conspiracy and violence who climb toward the top levels of the Soviet political and social pyramid where blind obedience, crouching servility, jockeying for positions and power, and advancing on the cadavers of one's associates become a matter of survival.

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one's helplessness, feeling of rejection, and dependence upon the controlling power is especially keenly felt. In such conditions even a slight deviation might provoke a feeling of guilt, need for self-punishment and suffering; it might call for public self-humiliation, confession of errors and pledges to repent and to correct the wrong done, especially when such practices are supported by the inherited traditions. There is therefore a certain degree of truth in the assertion of the Bolsheviks, that "Criticism and self-criticism is a great driving force in the development of Soviet society."[10]

II

In a "prison and barracks" society privileges of power and ideas of grandeur do not sufficiently compensate for lack of acceptance, isolation, humiliations, feelings of insecurity, and sense of inferiority and rejection. In an atmosphere of suspicion, intrigue, degradation, and lack of intimate personal and intellectual contact and of social support, anxieties, fears, extreme self-concern, and deep antagonisms easily flourish. Such a situation tends to magnify feelings of destructive aggression developed on the family level and is therefore likely to become overcharged with extreme hostilities and hatreds; it is likely to become full of potential explosiveness which may be directed against the ruling class itself unless convenient channels for discharge of aggressiveness are found.

In a society in which overt expressions of emotional behavior are under the control of a ruling clique, accumulating aggressions are readily directed against internal and external "enemies" of the regime, be they real or invented for the occasion. In this manner the feeling of hostility against the regime might be redirected against its opponents. It is therefore in the interest of survival of the ruling faction in such a society to cultivate hatred and destruction of the "enemy" by all means of public pressure, propaganda, agitation, education, as well as lawmaking.

These are the reasons why attitudes of extreme animosity against the "enemies of the Soviet Motherland" are propagated in the Soviet daily press and in the school textbooks. Stirring hatreds is one of the main tasks of Party agitators.[11] Accordingly

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of the outstanding tenets in the philosophy of Russian monasticism whose history is even longer than that of the Czardom was charitable love. Many sects of the *Raskolniki* propagated and practiced principles of humaneness. The Slavophils were especially prominent in advocating the return to an idealized stateless society of benevolent paternalism where brotherhood, Christian love, and compassion would reign. The "Westerners" endeavored to introduce into Russia Western concepts of justice and tolerance, and a humanistic, libertarian and juridical state. Russian belles-lettres, Russian school textbooks, as well as laws and regulations in the nineteenth century and up to the beginning of World War I, bear witness to this trend toward Westernization and humanism.

In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, after a brief initial period of reaction against the old regime which led toward an emphasis on all-human values and equalitarian brotherhood, soon the trend of events pushed the Bolshevik ideology in the opposite direction. The determination of a ruling clique of professional conspirators to maintain themselves in power by any and all means dictated the emphasis on the internal and external "threats" which would justify the intensification of internal "measures of security," and of external aggression. Thus vigilantism and war preparedness, and expansion of internal and external Bolshevik power, became the main base of the policies of the ruling class.[25] Such policies had to be constantly reinforced by a deliberate incitement to hatred and destruction.

The image of Soviet society as being in a constant state of war, not only against foreign enemies but against internal oppositionists, deviationists, spies, saboteurs, and remnants of bourgeois mentality has been determined by a social structure which the Bolshevik rulers themselves have created, but which makes their own power uncertain and precarious. In such circumstances Lenin's idea of a life and death struggle with the "class enemies," the idea that "it's them or us" (*Kto kogo*) has provided the main motivating force of the Party's internal and foreign policies. Fearing to be annihilated unless they themselves destroy their enemies, conscious that they have "either to rule or to die," the Bolsheviks have ruthlessly applied the principle of "obedience

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

or death" (*povinovenie ili smert*) in their rule; thus terror has become one of the main instruments of their power.

But once self-seeking careerists and fanatical devotees, specialists in violence, conspiracy and vigilance take into their hands the reins of a society which they indoctrinate with hatred and ruthlessness, the value of human life tends to be greatly lowered. In their constant struggle for survival, fear-ridden and extremely insecure, these people are forced to adopt an attitude of expendability toward all their subjects, just as earlier the Anarchists and Terrorists considered that all their members were only capital to be freely spent in the interest of the revolution.

In such conditions the disregard for individual rights and needs, and lack of consideration and of human feeling become generalized and are applied not only in dealings with enemies, but also in relations with associates, relatives, friends, allies and subjects in general whenever the vested interests of the ruling clique are threatened. The orders and the plans must be fulfilled; the victories must be made no matter what the cost in personal freedom and dignity, human suffering and human lives, because it is these orders, plans, and victories upon which the survival and the perpetuation of the ruling faction depends. All those who are in the way must be unconditionally sacrificed. Said Stalin:

> . . . it [is] easy to be a hero or a great leader if one had to do with the people such as the Russians . . . even persons of medium courage and even cowards became heroes in Russia. Those who do not . . . are killed.[26]

This attitude of disregard and contempt for human life when the survival of the ruling class and its vested interests are in question was expressed by Stalin also in his known interview with G. B. Wells. The magnitude of convict labor establishments, the police practices, and the extent of economic and other deprivations to which the Soviet subjects are exposed are all manifestations of this frame of mind.

The low value which is placed on human life in Bolshevik ideology is especially well demonstrated in war times. The Soviet armed forces command does not assess the cost of war in terms